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DO FOUNDERS CONTROL START-UP FIRMS
THAT GO PUBLIC?
BRIAN BROUGHMAN* & JESSE M. FRIED**
Black & Gilson (1998) argue that an IPO-welcoming stock market stimu-
lates venture deals by enabling VCs to give founders a valuable "call option on
control." We study 18,000 startups to investigate the value of this option. Among
firms that reach IPO, 60% of founders are no longer CEO. With little voting
power, only half of the others survive three years as CEO. At initial VC financ-
ing, the probability of getting real control of a public firm for three years is
0.4%. Our results shed light on control evolution in startups, and cast doubt on
the plausibility of the call-option theory linking stock and VC markets.
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INTRODUCTION
Startup founders, who typically must cede control of their firms to ob-
tain VC' financing, are widely believed to regain control in the event of an
initial public offering (IPO). This view is reinforced by the media salience of
prominent founders such as Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg, Google's Sergey
Brin and Larry Page, and Snap's Evan Spiegel. Travis Kalanick's loss of the
CEO position before Uber's IPO seems to be the exception that proves the
rule.2
Indeed, the possibility of founder control-reacquisition via IPO under-
lies an influential theory for why VC requires a robust stock market.3 On this
theory, an IPO-welcoming stock market makes possible a VC exit that can
return control to founders, enabling VCs to implicitly give founders a valua-
ble "call option on control" that they can exercise if successful. VCs' ability
to offer this call option, this theory claims, makes VC financing more ac-
ceptable to control-loving founders and can thereby spur more founder-VC
"deals."1
But we know little about the likelihood of founder-control return via
IPO, and the extent and duration of any such control. In short, we know little
about the ex ante value of this call option on control at the time when foun-
ders agree to accept VC financing. Prior work has, in passing, reported the
frequency of founders being CEO at IPO.5 But the samples are small, non-
random, and old. And because these studies had a different focus, they did
not consider the voting power of founder-CEOs at IPO, the extent and dura-
tion of founders' control post-IPO, or the ex ante likelihood of founder-con-
trol return via IPO.
We investigate the ex ante value of founders' call option on control via
IPO by collecting a sample of over 18,000 startups receiving first-round VC
funding during 1990-2012 ("financing vintages" 1990-2012), and then in-
vestigating, within a random subsample of these firms that conduct an IPO,
two measures of founder control: serving as CEO and voting power. For
each firm, we measure founder control at three points: upon completion of
' We use the abbreviation "VC" to denote "venture capitalist," "venture capital," or
"venture-capital fund."
2 For Travis Kalanick's (forced) resignation from his position as CEO of Uber, see Greg
Bensinger, Uber CEO Travis Kalanick Quits as Investors Revolt, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-resigns-1498023559.
3See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. EcON. 243, 243 (1998) [hereinafter Black &
Gilson (1998)]. According to SCOPUS (May 2018), Black & Gilson (1998) is in the top 5%
of JFE papers based on citation count.
4 See Section 2.
5 See, e.g., Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at
the Initial Public Offering, 46 J. L. & ECON. 569, 589 (2003); Steven N. Kaplan et al., Bet on
the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to
Public Companies, 64 J. FiN. 75, 96 (2009).
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IPO ("at IPO"), one year after IPO ("IPO +1"), and three years after lIPO
("IPO+3").
We start by measuring the frequency of founder-control reacquisition
via IPO ex post, that is, conditional on IPO. A founder is considered to have
"weak" control if she is CEO ("founder-CEO") and "strong" control if she
is CEO and, along with cofounders, has a voting interest of at least 30%
("founder-CEO/blockholder"). At IIPO, most founders lack even weak con-
trol: the frequency of founder-CEO is only 41%. Even fewer have strong
control. At IPO, the frequency of founder-CEO/blockholder is about 7%.
Moreover, for either type of control, founders' control generally is not "du-
rable" (lasting at least three years). By IiPO+3, the frequency of founder-
CEO drops from 41% to 21%, and the frequency of founder-CEO/
blockholder drops from about 7% to 2.5%. Even if a startup is successful
enough to reach IPO, a founder is unlikely to regain durable control.
We then use the 11,104 firms in financing vintages 1990-2002 to inves-
tigate the ex ante likelihood of founders exercising the call option on control.
We find that, as of initial VC financing, the likelihood is extremely remote.
The main reason: most VC-backed firms-including many of the most suc-
cessful-exit not via IPO but rather via sale to a buyer (an "M&A exit"). In
these financing vintages, only about 6% of founders take their firms to IPO
as CEO, and 1% take their firms to IPO as CEO/blockholder. Because of the
high frequency of post-IPO control attrition, the ex ante likelihood of ob-
taining durable control is even lower (3% for founder-CEO and 0.4% for
founder-CEO/blockholder).
We also investigate whether control return via IPO is a carrot to reward
the most successful founders-those generating the highest returns for VCs.
Since IPO exits are on average more profitable for VCs than M&A exits,
and only an IPO can return founder-control, founders reacquiring control via
IPO likely generate above-average returns for VCs. But the "carrot" hypoth-
esis might also be expected to apply within IPO exits: founders of IPO firms
should be more likely to retain control as IPO profitability for VCs in-
creases. Yet, we find no evidence that VC returns are positively correlated
with control reacquisition. Indeed, we find the opposite in some models;
higher VC returns are associated with a lower frequency of founder control.
Our paper contributes to the literature on founder exit from the CEO
position in VC-backed startups. Most prior work focuses on firms where
VCs exit via M&A 6 or have not yet exited.7 This work finds that founders
6 See, e.g., Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce
Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 1319, 1323-1325 (2013) [herein-
after Broughman & Fried (2013)].
' See NoAM WASSERMAN, THE FOUNDER'S DILEMMAS: ANTICIPATING ANI) AVOIDING THE
PITFALLs THAT CAN SINK A STARTUP 11-16 (2012) [hereinafter FOUNDER'S DILEMMAS]; An-
namaria Conti & Stuart J. H. Graham, Valuable Choices: Prominent Venture Capitalists' Influ-
ence on Startup CEO Replacements, MGMT. Sa., 2, 2-3 (2019); Thomas Hellmann & Manju
Puri, Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical Evidence, 57 J.
FIN. 169, 195 (2002); Noam Wasserman, Founder-CEO Succession and the Paradox of En-
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often exit the CEO position,' many times involuntarily.9 Work by Baker and
GompersIO and by Kaplan, Sensoy and Strdmberg" reports the frequency of
founder-CEO at IPO only in passing, as their focus is not the arc of founder
control. 12 Our work is the first to systematically examine founders' propen-
sity to remain CEO in VC-backed firms that are successful enough to go
public. Our results suggest that his propensity is surprisingly low. Our paper
is also the first to systematically measure founder voting power at and after
IPO, which is important for understanding how control of VC-backed firms
evolves over time.
Our paper sheds light on the plausibility of Black & Gilson (1998)'s
"call option on control" theory linking VC and stock markets. We show that
the ex ante likelihood of founders reacquiring control via IPO is extremely
low, especially when we focus on control that is both strong (founders have
enough voting power to ensure they remain in the saddle) and urable (con-
trol lasts at least three years). Our findings call into question the claim that
founders deciding whether to accept VC financing weigh heavily the ex ante
value of their call option on control via IPO. Our results therefore suggest
that an active IPO market might not be as important for sustaining a venture
ecosystem as is generally believed.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides the
motivation for our study. Part II describes our data. Part m reports the fre-
quency of founder-CEO at and after IPO. Part IV describes the frequency of
founder-CEO/blockholder at and after IPO. Part V briefly describes the ex
ante probability (as of initial VC financing) that a firm will have an IPO exit
with a founder-CEO or founder-CEO/blockholder. Part VI examines the re-
lationship between VC returns and founder control among IPO firms. Part
VII discusses limitations of our analysis.
trepreneurial Success, 14 ORG. SC. 149, 162-165 (2003). For a notable recent exception, see
Michael Ewens & Matt Marx, Founder Replacement and Startup Performance, 31 REv. FIN.
STUD. 1533, 1563-1564 (2018). They investigate the rate and effect of replacing founders
using a large sample of VC-backed startups founded between 1995 and 2008, some of which
reach IPO. But their study does not distinguish between founders serving as CEOs and foun-
ders serving in other executive roles, or between startups that reach IPO and those with suc-
cessful M&A exits, as its focus is not on measuring founder-control reacquisition via IPO.
'See, e.g., Broughman & Fried (2013), supra note 6, at 1323-1325; Brian Broughman,
Investor Opportunism and Governance in Venture Capital, in VENTURE CAPITAL: INVESTMENT
STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES AND Poicies 355-357 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2010).
* See, e.g., FOUNDER S DILEMMAS, supra note 7, at 16 (2012).
10 See Baker & Gompers, supra note 5, at 589 (examining several hundred VC-backed
IPOs during 1978-1987).
" See Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 96 (examining a small, non-random sample of IPOs
in 2004).
12 See also Bharat A. Jain & Filiz Tabak, Factors Influencing the Choice between Founder
versus Non-Founder CEOs for IPO Firms, 23 J. Bus. VENTURING 21, 41-42 (2008) (reporting
founder-CEO at IPO in several hundred VC-backed IPOs in 1997); Timothy G. Pollock et al.,
Dance with the One that Brought You? Venture Capital Firms and the Retention of Founder-
CEOs, 3 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 199, 211-212 (2009) (reporting founder-CEO at
IPO in about 190 VC-backed firms during 1995-2000).
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I. VENTURE CAPITAL AND STOCK MARKETS
A. The Observed Link between Venture Capital and Stock Markets
The American VC market is widely admired both at home and abroad.
Many of the country's largest and most successful companies-such as Ap-
ple, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon-began life as startups backed by VCs.
VC-backed firms are also believed to play a significant role in supporting
innovation across the economy."
Not surprisingly, policy makers around the world have sought to culti-
vate local VC markets.14 The academic literature suggests that an important
ingredient is an active stock market, particularly one that welcomes small
VC-backed companies seeking an IPO.'5 As Armour and Cumming relate,
"[t]he principal proposition established in the literature is that venture capi-
tal flourishes in countries with deep and liquid stock markets."'6 This belief
is reflected in policymaking such as the 2012 JOBS Act,17 which aims to
remove barriers to IPOs to stimulate entrepreneurship.
Casual observation certainly confirms an association between the ro-
bustness of VC ecosystems and the depth and liquidity of stock markets.'The
United States, home to the world's deepest and most liquid stock market,
was the first country to develop a VC market.'8 Even as VC has globalized
in search of opportunities outside the United States, the United States still
has by far the biggest VC market, attracting more than 50% of VC invest-
ment worldwide.'9 Notably, other developed economies-such as Japan and
3 See generally ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPrrxI AND THE Fi-
NANCE OF INNOVATION (2d ed. 2010); Paul Gompers & Josh Lemer, The Venture Capital
Revolution, 15 J. EcON. PERSP. 145 (2001); Manju Puri & Rebecca Zarutskie, On the Life
Cycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital-and non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms, 67 J. FIN. 2247
(2012).
14 See generally Ralf Becker & Thomas Hellmann, The Genesis of Venture Capital: Les-
sons from the German Experience (CESifo Working Paper No. 883, 2003); Ronald J. Gilson,
Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1067 (2003); Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
717 (2009).
" See, e.g., John Armour & Douglas Cumming, The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley, 58
OxFoRD ECON. PAPERS 596, 596 (2006); Black & Gilson (1998), supra note 3, at 245; Marco
Da Rin et a]., Public Policy and the Creation of Active Venture Capital Markets, 90 J. PUB.
EcON. 1699, 1700 (2006); Gilson, supra note 14, 1075; Leslie A. Jeng & Philippe C. Wells,
The Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence across Countries, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 241,
285 (2000).
16 See Armour & Cumming, supra note 15, at 596.
" For background on the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, see U.S. SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS (JOBS) ACT (Dec. 9,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobs-act.shtml.
" See Andreas Oehler et al., Venture Capital in Europe: Closing the Gap to the U.S., in
VENTURE CAPITAL IN EUROPE 4 (Greg Gregoriou, Maher Kooli & Roman KraeussL eds., 2007).
19 See Nenad Marovac, Europe's Venture Capitalists are Closing the Gap with Silicon
Valley, WORLD ECoNOMIC FORUM (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/11/
europe-venture-capitalists-silicon-valley/.
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Germany-lack both a vibrant VC market and an active stock market that
welcomes IPOs. 2 0
Of course, there may well be noncausal reasons for this cross-country
association. A country's robust legal protection of investors might cause both
VC markets and stock markets to flourish, even if each could flourish with-
out the other. Similarly, cultures that are more risk-taking, individualistic,
and focused on personal wealth creation (for example, the United States) are
more likely than other cultures (for example, Japan and Germany) to gener-
ate large pools of risk capital and human capital in the form of high-powered
financiers and operational talent necessary for both vibrant VC markets and
deep, liquid stock markets.
But the association between VC and stock markets might be driven, at
least in part, by causal factors. One possibility: the stock market boosts the
VC market by providing a "thicker exit" for VCs. VCs seek to generate
financial returns by purchasing shares in private firms and then later selling
them at a much higher price, either to an acquirer in an M&A exit or to
public investors in an IPO.2 1 The availability of IPO exit as an alternative to
sale can increase VCs' expected financial returns (thereby boosting VC in-
vestment) by increasing the number of "bidders" for VC-backed firms. 2 2
B. The Control-Reacquisition Theory
In an influential paper, Black and Gilson23 dismissed (without elabora-
tion) the thicker-exit explanation for why the United States had an active VC
market and Germany and Japan did not, offering instead their call-option
theory, concisely summarized in subsequent work:
20 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active
Stock Market?, II J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36 (1999) [hereinafter Black & Gilson (1999)]. For
Germany and Japan, little appears to have changed in this respect since the mid-1990s. See
McKINSEY & COMPANY GLOBAL lNsTI'uT, THE FUTURF OF JAPAN: REIGNITING PRODUCTIV-
rry AND GRoWTH (2015); Georg Metzger & Albrecht Bauer, Germany's Private Equity Market
Lacks Venture Capital, 98 Focus ON EcON. 1 (2015).
21 A third potential exit option is to have the startup repurchase the VCs' equity stake. But
startups generally do not have sufficient capital to cash out VCs. See Black & Gilson (1998),
supra note 3, at 274.
22 A stock market can boost VCs' expected returns for a variety of reasons. First, public
investors may assign a higher valuation to a VC-backed firm than the most interested acquirer.
Public investors might assign a higher valuation than the acquirer for any number of reasons,
including the possibility that the firm will be worth more as a standalone public firm than as
the wholly owned subsidiary of a public or private firm (think Google, Amazon, or Facebook).
Second, the possibility of exit via an IPO gives additional leverage to VCs negotiating with a
potential acquirer, especially when there is only a single such buyer. Indeed, many IPOs are
part of an IPO-to-M&A strategy where VCs intending to sell a firm first take it public to set a
floor on the valuation. For either or both of these reasons, the possibility of IPO exit may
encourage VC investment ex ante by increasing expected returns. For evidence of a link be-
tween stock market performance and fluctuations in VC activity, see generally Marco Da Rin
et al., supra note 15; Jeng & Wells, supra note 15.
23 See Black & Gilson (1998), supra note 3.
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The United States has both an active venture capital industry and
well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither.
We argue here that this is no accident-that venture capital can
flourish especially-and perhaps only-if the venture capitalist
can exit from a successful portfolio company through an initial
public offering (IPO), which requires an active stock market. Un-
derstanding the link between the stock market and the venture cap-
ital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements
between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers especially the
importance of exit by venture capitalists and the opportunity, pre-
sent only if IPO exit is possible, for the venture capitalist and the
entrepreneur to enter into an implicit contract over control, in
which a successful entrepreneur can reacquire control from the
venture capitalist by using an IPO as the means of exit.2 4
According to Black and Gilson, "the prospect of an IPO exit gives the entre-
preneur something of a call option on control, contingent on the firm's
success. "25
The "call option on control" theory linking the stock and VC markets is
quite plausible, requiring only three noncontroversial assumptions:
Many Founders Value Control. While control can always provide finan-
cial private benefits,26 non-pecuniary private benefits (for example, the satis-
faction of bringing new products to market) are likely to be just as-or even
more-valuable to the founders of a startup. And a founder's non-pectiniary
interest in her firm is vulnerable if she is forced to give up control to an
equity investor that focuses solely on monetary returns.2 7
Founders Must Cede Control to Obtain VC Financing. VCs will not
invest in a startup without receiving substantial control rights at a founder's
expense, including the ability to replace the founder as CEO 28 and block
transactions they dislike.29 Thus, VCs typically provide funding in stages as
a means to obtain leverage between financing rounds;3 0 negotiate for pre-
ferred shares with substantial blocking rights;" and typically ensure that
24 See Black & Gilson (1999), supra note 20, at 36.
25 See Black & Gilson (1998), supra note 3, at 261.
26 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 312 (1976).
27 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial
Contracting, 59 REV. EcON. Srun. 473, 473 (1992).
28 See Broughman & Fried (2013), supra note 6, at 1347.
29 See Ola Bengtsson, Covenants in Venture Capital Contracts, 57 MAN. Sc. 1926, 1928
(2011). For evidence that VCs' removal of founders from executive positions can improve
startup outcomes, see Ewens & Marx, supra note 7.
30 See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Cap-
ital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1464 (1995).
" See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Star-
tups, 81 NYU L. REV. 967, 987 (2006); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Con-
tracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70
REV. EcoN. STuD. 281, 313 (2003).
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VCs and independent directors have enough board seats to replace the
CEO.3 2 The fact that founders are frequently involuntarily removed from the
CEO position33 indicates that they have lost control.
An IPO, Unlike an M&A Exit, Can Restore Founder Control. An IPO
exit can, in theory, return control to a control-valuing founder, as an IPO
requires VCs to give up their blocking rights and convert their preferred
shares into common stock.3 4 Following the standard 180-day lockup period,
VCs begin selling these common shares.35 And, as the firm transitions to a
public company, VC directors will start leaving the board.36 In short, an IPO
replaces the VCs-who have concentrated positions and substantial control
rights-with relatively dispersed and generally more passive public inves-
tors." By contrast, an M&A exit never returns control to the founder.38
Rather, the sale consolidates control in the hands of the acquirer, for which
the founder can now work as a hired manager.
Obviously, Black & Gilson (1998)'s "call option on control" theory
and the thicker-exit causal explanation are not mutually exclusive. A vibrant
stock market might lead to a more dynamic VC market both because VCs
earn higher returns when IPOs provide an alternative to M&A and because
founders are more willing to cede control to VCs if there is a prospect of an
IPO.39 And neither of these causal explanations is mutually exclusive with
the noncausal cultural and legal explanations for the observed association
between VC and stock markets.
The question we seek to address is whether the prospect of control-
reacquisition by founders in the event of IPO is likely to affect the VC
32 Brian Broughman & Jesse Fried, Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-
Backed Firms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 386 (2010); Broughman, supra note 8, at 347.
" See, e.g., FOUNDER'S DILEMMAS, supra note 7, at 158.
' See Broughman & Fried (2013), supra note 6, at 1323.
35 See Laura Casares Field & Gordon Hanka, The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups, 56 J.
FIN. 471, 471 (2001); Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, A Cross-Country Com-
parison of Full and Partial Venture Capital Exits, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 511, 513 (2003).
36 See, e.g., FoUNDER'S DILEMMAS, supra note 7. This transition allows the VC investors to
redeploy their human capital (and financial capital) into new ventures. See, e.g., Black &
Gilson (1998), supra note 3, at 261; Claudio Michelacci & Javier Suarez, Business Creation
and the Stock Market, 71 REv. EcON. STUD. 459, 459 (2004).
" Because of the increased availability of financing for late-stage private firms, some
founders may seek to postpone an M&A exit or IPO exit by remaining private longer. See
Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Deregulation of the Private Equity Market and the
Decline in IPOs 1 (Working Paper, 2019). But the VCs must exit at some point.
3 See Broughman & Fried (2013), supra note 6, at 1323.
39 One potential critique of the control-reacquisition theory for why the United States has
an active VC market and Japan and Germany do not (which would also apply to the thicker-
exit explanation) is that VC-backed firms in Japan and Germany could go public in the U.S.
See Edward B. Rock, Greenhorns, Yankees, and Cosmopolitans: Venture Capital, IPOs, For-
eign Firms, and U.S. Markets, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 711, 717 (2001) (noting the stock
market that returns control to founders need not be domestic and that, in fact, VC-backed
Israeli firms frequently go public on Nasdaq rather than on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange).
However, cultural, legal, or other barriers might make such a cross-border IPO difficult.
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ecosystem by inducing founders to cede control to VCs in exchange for
funding. In other words, how valuable is the call option on control at the
time of initial VC funding? The option's value will depend in large part on
the likelihood that a founder will reacquire control in the event of IPO (as
well as the extent and duration of control) and the ex ante likelihood of IPO,
all of which we investigate.
II. DATABASE OF VC-BACKED FIRms
We construct a database of VC-backed startups, a subset of which even-
tually conduct an IPO. The remainder of this Part explains how we assem-
bled and collected data (Part H.A) and provides descriptive statistics for
these firms (Part II.B).
A. Constructing a Sample of VC-Backed Firms
Using the VentureXpert (VX) database, we identify a population of
VC-backed startup firms: U.S.-based firms that receive their first round of
VC funding between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2012 ("financing
vintages" 1990-2012). We limit our analysis to firms that are private at the
time of initial VC investment, and we exclude firms that receive less than $5
million in aggregate VC funding.40 These criteria yield a population of
18,809 VC-backed firms (the "VC-backed population").
We then identify firms in the VC-backed population that conducted an
IPO during 1990-2012 ("IPO vintages" 1990-2012). There were 1961 such
firms-10.4% of the VC-backed population-which we call the "full IPO
subgroup." To obtain information on founder control at IPO, we randomly
select 700 IPO firms-about 35% of the full IPO subgroup-and hand-col-
lect data from SEC filings.41 We obtain data for 652 of these 700 firms. 42 We
refer to this group of 652 firms as the "IPO research sample." For the IPO
research sample, we record two variables: (1) whether the CEO is a founder
("founder-CEO") and (2) aggregate equity voting rights of each firm's
founder(s) ("founder voting power").
Black & Gilson (1998)'s43 "call option on control" theory assumes that
founders value the prospect of reacquiring control in the event of IPO. Pre-
' The $5 million funding threshold may bias our sample towards larger and more success-
ful startup firms, as firms that fail to obtain $5 million in funding are unlikely to be successful
enough to IPO. Thus, our findings overstate the probability that any given startup (or even one
receiving VC financing) will IPO.
41 As data collection from SEC filings is labor intensive, we did not collect data for each
firm in the full IPO subgroup.
42 Most of the SEC filings used in this project are available online via the SEC's EDGAR
website. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, EDGAR Company Filings, https://
www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). Pre-1996 fil-
ings were pulled from microfiche files.
4 See Black & Gilson (1998), supra note 3.
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sumably, founders would expect to enjoy control not only right after IPO but
also for a reasonable duration thereafter. However, many VC-backed firms
that conduct an IPO remain independent and public only for a brief period,
because the firms are either acquired or otherwise forced to delist.4 Even if a
firm remains public, a founder-CEO at IPO may be replaced as CEO shortly
after IPO. To the extent the control reacquired via lIPO is expected to be
short lived (say, one year), its ex ante value is likely to be lower than if such
control were longer lived. To determine duration of founder control post-
IPO, we measure founder-CEO and founder voting power not only at IPO,
but also at two subsequent dates: IPO+1 (one year after lIPO) and IPO+3
(three years after IPO).45 We measure these variables at IPO by using the
final lIPO prospectus filing 4 6 and at IPO+1 and IPO+3 by using annual
proxy statement filings.47
There is potential truncation in our analysis, as some of the VC-backed
population may have an (unobserved) IPO after 2012. Given the ten-year
duration of VC funds, VC-backed startups are generally expected to reach
exit within five to seven years of initial financing. Thus, truncation is prima-
rily a concern for later financing vintages. By contrast, the truncation con-
cern is fairly minimal for firms with pre-2003 financing vintages, as such
firms have had more than ten years to reach an exit event.48 We thus limit the
ex ante portion of our analysis and corresponding regression models to star-
tups from pre-2003 financing vintages.
' See Andrej Gill & Uwe Walz, Going Public-Going Private: The Case of VC-Backed
Firms 1 (Center for Financial Studies, Working Paper No. 2012/02, 2012) (finding that 80% of
all VC-backed firms that entered the public market during 1975-2010 delisted within ten
years, versus 37% of other IPO firms).
45 If a Founder-CEO at IPO is no longer a public-company CEO at IPO+ I or IPO+3, it is
likely to be for one of the following three reasons. First, the founder voluntarily left the CEO
position (or sold the firm), even though she could have remained CEO of a public company.
Such a decision would suggest, contra Black & Gilson (1998), that the founder does not place
such a high value on being CEO of a public company. Second, the founder preferred to remain
CEO of a public company, but was involuntarily replaced. Such a move would suggest, also
contra Black & Gilson (1998), that being the CEO does not, in fact, give the founder control
(or sufficiently "broad discretion"). Third, business setbacks forced the Founder-CEO to sell
the firm to an acquirer or caused the firm to file for bankruptcy.
To the extent founders accepting first round financing from VCs anticipate any of these
post-IPO outcomes, each of which causes the founders to cease being CEO of a public com-
pany, the possibility of a control-restoring IPO will have less effect on their decision to cede
control to VCs ex ante. That is, a founder who anticipates losing control post-IPO will place
less value ex ante on the prospect of an IPO exit, and the existence or nonexistence of an IPO
market will have less impact on their decision to take VC financing. Thus, to examine the
plausibility of the control-reacquisition theory, we must look not only at whether the founder is
CEO at IPO, but also at whether she remains CEO for some time thereafter.
46 We use the 424b4 SEC filing on the IPO date, as it includes better price data than the S-
I filing prior to IPO.
47 For IPO+ 1, we use the firm's first definitive proxy statement (DEF 14A) filed at least
twelve months after IPO (which could be filed as late as twenty-four months after IPO). For
IPO+3, we use the first DEF 14A filed at least thirty-six months after IPO (which could be
filed as late as forty-eight months after IPO).
" We limit data collection to firms that IPO before 2013 so we can observe founder con-
trol at IPO+1 and IPO+3.
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B. Description of Sample Firms
Table 1 compares the IPO research sample (n=652) to the full IPO
subgroup (n= 1961) and the VC-backed population (n= 18,809). In the VC-
backed population, firms receive on average $50 million in VC financing
(before any IPO) by the end of 2012. We denote this amount as "total VC
financing" even though some of these firms may receive additional VC fi-
nancing after 2012. IPO firms receive on average approximately twice as
much total VC financing ($98.7 million for the full IPO subgroup and $94.1
million for the IPO research sample).49
Table 1, Panel A sorts results by financing vintage (1990-2012). Re-
flecting the effect of the dotcom bubble, Panel A shows a steep increase in
firms receiving initial VC financing during 1994-2000, followed by a sharp
drop-off in 2001.
Figure 1 shows IPO frequency. Panel A sorts IPOs by IPO vintage.
Reflecting the dotcom bubble, there is a surge in IPOs in 1999 and 2000,
followed by a large decline in 2001. Panel B reports similar data, but sorted
by financing vintage rather than by IPO vintage. Firms in the VC-backed
population with pre-1995 financing vintage have a 30%-40% likelihood of
IPO. By contrast, the IPO likelihood for later financing vintages is much
lower: less than 10% for most vintages. To be sure, the low rate of IPOs on
the right side of the graph (Panel B) may be partially explained by truncation
(unobserved future IPOs). Other research, however, suggests the decline is
not due simply to truncation of IPO events, but rather reflects a fundamental
change in the IPO market: a decline in small-firm IPOs that began before the
collapse of the dotcom bubble.0
4 For all three groups, however, there is a wide gap between mean and median amounts of
total VC financing.
'0 See Robert P. Bartlett et al., The Small IPO and the Investing Preferences of Mutual
Funds, 47 J. CORP. FIN. 151, 171 (2017); Ning Gao & Bharat A. Jain, Founder Management
and the Market for Corporate Control for IPO Firms: The Moderating Effect of the Power
Structure of the Firm, 27 J. BusINEss VENTURTNG 112 (2012).
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF IPO ExITS
IN THE VC-BACKED POPULATION
Panel A: Number of IPOs Among Sample Firms, Sorted by IPO Vintage
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Table 1, Panel B sorts firms by business sector. VC-backed firms are
typically in high-tech sectors; software, internet, and communications-re-
lated businesses are particularly common. Among these sectors, however,
there is considerable variance in IPO likelihood. For example, Panel B
shows that of the 1201 biotechnology firms in the VC-backed population,
nearly a quarter (24.1%) had an IPO exit by the end of 2012, while the rate
is less than 10% for software (7.2%) and internet (8.1%).
Panel C presents the same data sorted by location (the state in which the
firm is headquartered). VC is geographically clustered in entrepreneurial en-
claves. Approximately 40% of the VC-backed population is headquartered
in California and another 10% is in Massachusetts. The only other states that
exceed 5% are New York and Texas. Firm location, however, does not ap-
pear to materially affect IPO likelihood.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the IPO research sample. In this
sample, firms average five separate rounds of VC financing, with invest-
ments from eight different VC firms. Firms that reach IPO typically do so
quickly. We find that the average length of time from initial VC financing to
IPO is a little over four years. The average amount of pre-IPO VC financing
is $94.1 million and the average market cap at IPO is $443 million. Consis-
tent with Bartlett et al.," we find that firms with post-1998 financing vintage
years receive more VC financing before IPO and have larger IPOs.
Consistent with prior research, the vast majority of firms incorporate in
Delaware.52 California is the only other domicile to exceed 5% of total incor-
porations, and its use has declined sharply over time.
51 See Bartlett et al., supra note 50.
52 See generally Brian Broughman et al., Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and
Evidence, 57 J. L. & ECON. 865 (2014).
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Table 2 also shows that approximately 5% of the firms in the IPO re-
search sample went public with a dual-class structure.53 Dual-class IPOs are
relevant for our study, as they can be used to increase a founder's post-IPO
voting power and in some cases secure long-term control. Indeed, this strat-
egy was famously used in several high-profile VC-backed IiPOs (including
Google, Facebook, and Snap). Consistent with the view that dual-class IPOs
are increasingly common, we find that approximately 15% of firms in the
IPO research sample with financing vintages 2005-2012 go public with a
dual-class structure. For most of the years that we study, however, VC-
backed firms have been less likely than other firms to have a dual-class
structure immediately following their IPO.5 "
El. Do FOUNDERS BECOME (AND REMAIN) CEO OF A PUBLIC COMPANY?
The "call option on control" theory linking IPO and VC markets as-
sumes the founders can regain control at IPO. But what does "control"
mean? In this section, we consider a "weak" version of control: a founder
becomes CEO of a public company, even if she does not have enough voting
power to thwart replacement.5 While the CEO of a public company does
have power, she can be replaced by directors (and thus, indirectly, by the
shareholders who elect them), constraining her room to maneuver. At best,
the CEO position provides conditional control: as long as the CEO keeps
directors and shareholders satisfied, she can do whatever she wants. In the
next Part, we consider a "strong" version of control: the founder is CEO and
has enough voting power to remain CEO.
To investigate whether founders acquire weak control in the event of
IPO, we examine the 652 firms in the IPO research sample to check for
founder-CEO right after IPO. We then determine whether the firm remains
public and the founder continues to be CEO at IPO+ 1 and IPO+ 3.56 If the
founder remains in the CEO position through IPO + 3, we deem the founder's
(weak) control to be "durable."
53 By "dual-class structure," we mean the firm has at least two classes of common stock.
To identify these firms, we use Jay Ritter's list of IPOs-from 1980 to 2015-with multiple
share classes outstanding. See Jay R. Ritter, IPO Data, WARRINGTON COLLEGE OF BusINEss,
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). This classification is
described in Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed over Time?, 33
FIN. MAN. 5, 33-34 (2004).
54 See generally Laura Casares Field & Michelle Lowry, Bucking the Trend: Why Do IPOs
Choose Controversial Governance Structures and Why Do Investors Let Them (Working Pa-
per, 2019). We confirm their results by comparing the baseline rate of dual-class IPOs for all
IPOs to the rate for VC-backed IPOs, using data from Jay R. Ritter, supra note 53.
" Black & Gilson (1998), which put forward the control-reacquisition theory, appears to
use this founder-CEO definition of control: "Control becomes vested in the entrepreneur, who
often retains a controlling stock interest and, even if not, retains the usual broad discretion
enjoyed by chief executives of companies without a controlling shareholder." See Black &
Gilson (1998), supra note 3, at 261.
56 Henceforth, we use the term "CEO" to mean "CEO of the public incarnation of the
startup."
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A. Founder-CEO at IPO?
To check for founder-CEO at IPO, we review the CEO's biography in
the management section of the IPO prospectus and classify the CEO as a
founder if she is described as a founder, a cofounder, or a person employed
by the firm since formation. Table 3, Panel A shows that 269 (41.2%) of the
652 firms in the IPO research sample had a founder-CEO at IPO.57 This rate
is lower than that reported in other studies.58
We investigate the correlates of founder-CEO at IPO. Consistent with
Baker & Gompers,59 the frequency of founder-CEO at IPO is higher if dura-
tion to IPO is shorter and pre-IPO VC financing is lower (Table 3, Panel B).
We also sort by the presence of elite VCs.6 Consistent with Baker &
Gompers,61 their presence is associated with a lower probability of founder-
CEO at IPO.62
5 In another twenty firms, the founder group had at least 30% of the equity voting power
but a nonfounder served as CEO. Compare Table 5, Panel B, with Table 5, Panel C. In such
firms, a founder might have been able to remain CEO had he or she so chosen.
5 See Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 110 (reporting a 51% frequency of founder-CEO in a
sample of 106 VC-backed IPOs in 2004); Pollock et al., supra note 12, at 209 (reporting a
frequency of 60% in a sample of 193 VC-backed IPOs during 1995-2000); Jain & Tabak,
supra note 12, at 32 (reporting a frequency of 58% in a sample of several hundred VC-backed
IPOs in 1997); Baker & Gompers, supra note 5, at 574 (reporting a rate of 55% for several
hundred VC-backed IPOs during 1978-1987).
' See Baker & Gompers, supra note 5, at 590.
' We identify startups funded by an elite (top ten) VC firm using rankings of VC firms
prepared by CB Insights based on a poll of VC general partners conducted with the New York
Times. See Venture Capital Power Rankings: VCs Rate VCs, CB INSIGHTS (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/venture-capital-peer-rankings/. The top-ten ranked VC firms
were: Sequoia, Benchmark, Accel Partners, Greylock Partners, Andreessen Horowitz, Union
Square Ventures, First Round, Bessemer Venture Partners, KPCB, and NEA.
6' See generally Baker & Gompers, supra note 5.
62 A study of still-private VC-backed firms finds that the presence of an elite VC is associ-
ated with a higher likelihood of founder replacement in such firms as well. See Conti & Gra-
ham, supra note 7, at 2.
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TABLE 3: FOUNDER CONTROL AT IPO
For 652 U.S.-based VC-backed IPO firms that receive initial VC financing during the period
1990-2012, this table reports data on measures of founder control right after ("at") IPO (Panel
A) and difference-of-means tests correlating founder control with various firm characteristics
(Panel B).
Panel A
All Sorted by Year of First VC Financing
Years 1990- 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010-
1994 1999 2004 2009 2012
Founder-CEO at IPO 41.2% 44.5% 44.4% 31.8% 32.6% 30.8%
Founder voting power (%) at IPO 11.1% 10.3% 12.4% 8.3% 12.7% 4.8%
Panel B
Obs. Founder-CEO Founder Voting Power
Amount of Pre-IPO Financing
- Above Median ($51.8m) 326 37.7% 8.9%
- Below Median 326 44.7% 13.1%
Difference of Means -.070* -.042***
Number of Financing Rounds
- > 5 287 39.4% 8.3%
- S 5 365 42.7% 13.4%
Difference of Means -.033 -.051***
Years from First Financing to IPO
- Above Median (3.7 years) 315 36.8% 7.8%
- Below Median 337 45.4% 14.3%
Difference of Means -.086** -.065***
Dual-Class IPO
- Yes 34 41.2% 24.1%
- No 618 41.2% 10.4%
Difference of Means .000 .137***
Financed by Top-Ten VC Firm
- Yes 158 36.1% 11.4%
- No 491 42.9% 10.9%
Difference of Means -.068 .005
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FIGURE 2: Ex POST LIKELMOOD OF FOUNDER-CEO AT AND AFTER IPO
Using data from a sample of 652 U.S.-based VC-backed IPO firms, the figures below plot
Lowess curves illustrating the likelihood a sample firm has a founder-CEO at IPO, IPO+I,
and IPO+3. Data are separately displayed based on IPO vintage (Panel A) and financing
vintage (Panel B).
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For the 652 firms in the IPO research sample, Figure 2 illustrates time
trends in the likelihood of founder-CEO at IPO. In each graph the solid
black curve reports founder-CEO likelihood at IPO. Panel A reports results
based on IPO vintage (that is, year of IPO). We observe that the likelihood
of a founder-CEO at IPO peaks around 45% at the height of the dotcom
bubble in the late 1990s (Figure 2, Panel A), around the time when Black
and Gilson put forward their "call option on control" theory. Research on
IPO grandstanding63 suggests many VC-backed firms in the late 1990s were
taken public early-after minimal financing-so VCs seeking to raise new
funds could tout their achievements. Because a founder is more likely to be
replaced as CEO as time goes on, grandstanding could account for the higher
frequency of IPO firms with founder-CEO during the dotcom bubble. Panel
B reports the same data sorted by financing vintage rather than by IPO
vintage.
B. Founder-CEO after IPO?
Figure 2 also plots the likelihood that a founder continues to be CEO at
IPO+ 1 and IPO+3. Of the 269 founder-CEOs at IPO, sixty are no longer
CEO at IPO+1 (Table 4, Panel A) and 131 are no longer CEO at IPO+3.
Thus, of the 269 founder-CEOs at IPO, only 138 had durable control. In the
IPO research sample, moving from IPO to IPO+3 reduces the frequency of
founder-CEO from 41.2% to 21.2%.
Figure 2 illustrates the likelihood of founder-CEO at IPO+1 with a
dashed line, and at IPO+3 with a dotted line. While the likelihood of
founder-CEO at IPO peaks in the late 1990s, the likelihood of founder-CEO
at IPO+3, based on IPO vintage, is stable at around 20% over the entire
sample period (Figure 2, Panel A). Founder-CEOs who took their company
public in the late 1990s had a high attrition rate, as illustrated by the large
gap between the curves for IPO and IPO+3 during this time period.
Table 4 highlights two factors that cause founders to lose the CEO posi-
tion after IPO. First, consistent with Gill & Walz," many IPO firms do not
remain public. Panel B shows that by IPO+3 approximately 36% (235 out
of 652) of firms in the IPO research sample were no longer public, with
many (124) acquired shortly after IPO.
Panel C focuses on the subgroup of 269 firms with founder-CEO at
IPO. We find that 197 (or 73%) of these firms remain public at IPO+3.
Thus, seventy firms with founder-CEO at IPO were delisted within three
years. Of these seventy firms, we can determine that thirty-two were ac-
63 See Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FiN. ECON.
133 (1996); Peggy M. Lee & Sunil Wahal, Grandstanding, Certification and the Underpricing
of Venture Capital Backed IPOs, 73 J. FN. EcoN. 375 (2004).
* See Andrej Gill & Uwe Walz, Going Public-Going Private: The Case of VC-Backed
Firms (Working Paper, 2012).
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quired.65 The remaining thirty-eight firms were delisted for other reasons
(such as bankruptcy).66 Whatever the reason for delisting, the result is that
IPO exits that create a public company for the long term (in which a founder
might enjoy control) are even less common than suggested by the rate of
IPOs reported in Table 1.
Second, even if a firm in the IPO research sample does remain public
for three years after IPO, many founders exit the CEO position before the
three-year mark. Table 4, Panel A shows that even for surviving firms, the
frequency of founder-CEO drops from 41.2% at IPO to 33.1% at IPO+3.
The fact that approximately 25% of founder-CEOs exit the CEO position
while the firm remains public suggests, contrary to the "call option on con-
trol" theory, that the founder either did not have sufficient control to keep
herself in the CEO position or, if the exit was voluntary, the founder did not
value whatever control she enjoyed as CEO.67
" To identify such firms, we matched firm names from the non-surviving group with
public targets in the SDC Platinum mergers and acquisitions database. An inability to match
names might have led to some omissions.
* Our sample thus appears similar to that of an earlier study. See Kaplan et al., supra note
5, at 81 (finding in a sample of fifty VC-firms conducting an IPO that, within three years, eight
were acquired and three filed for bankruptcy).
6 Our results are similar to that of Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 96 (finding in a sample
of fifty VC-backed IPOs that 58% have a founder-CEO at the IPO, but that of the thirty-two
firms that remained public for three years (and for which data could be obtained) only 38%
had a founder-CEO at IPO+3).
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TABLE 4: FIRM AND FOUNDER-CEO SURVIVAL AT AND AFTER IPO
For 652 U.S.-based VC-backed IPO firms that received initial VC financing during 1990-2012,
this table reports firm and founder-CEO survival for one and three years post IPO.
Panel A: CEO Survival
IPO IPO+1 IPO+3
Surviving Firms 652 530 417
Founder-CEO # 269 209 138
Founder-CEO %
- of surviving IPO research sample 41.2% 39.4% 33.1%
- of IPO research sample 41.2% 32.1% 21.2%
Panel B: Firm Survival (unconditional)
At IPO IPO+1 IPO+3
Surviving Firms 652 530 417
Non-Surviving Firms (cumulative total) 122 235
- non-survival due to merger-sale 53 124
- non-survival for other reasons 69 111
Panel C: Firm Survival (conditional on Founder-CEO at IPO)
At IPO IPO+1 IPO+3
Surviving Firms w/ Founder-CEO at IPO 269 235 197
Non-Surviving Firms (cumulative total) . 34 70
- non-survival due to merger-sale . 9 32
- non-survival for other reasons . 25 38
IV. Do FOUNDER-CEOs HAVE (AND KEEP) SUBSTANTIAL
. VOTING POWER?
While being CEO gives one power in a public firm, it does not necessa-
rily provide real control or even substantial insulation from a control chal-
lenge. This lack of control may help explain why, in our IPO research
sample, 50% of founder-CEOs at IPO are no longer CEO at IPO+3.
"Strong" control comes from a founder-CEO, along with cofounders, hav-
ing a large block of shares conferring substantial voting power.
68 There is
6 Although board seats might be seen as an indicator of founder control, directors can be
replaced by shareholders. Thus, what matters is shareholder voting power. For completeness,
however, we collect data on founder board seats at IPO and find that, on average, they occupy
15.3% of these seats.
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little known about founder voting power.69 We thus investigate founder vot-
ing power in our IPO research sample at IPO and thereafter to determine
whether founders reacquire strong control in the event of IPO.
A. Founder Voting Power at and after IPO
To determine founder voting power at close of IPO, we rely on the
"Principal Stockholders" section of the IPO prospectus. This section lists
the stock ownership-after the issuance of new IPO shares-of each person
who owns at least 5% of the common stock, each director, each named exec-
utive officer, and all stockholders selling shares in the IPO. We aggregate
the voting power of any founders on this list.70 If no founder is listed, we
record founder voting power as zero.' After IPO (at IPO+1 and IPO+3),
we rely on the "Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Man-
agement" section of the annual proxy statement, which provides similar
information.
We begin by describing average voting power in the full IPO research
sample and then focus more closely on firms with founder-CEOs at IPO. For
the full IPO research sample, average founder voting power is 11.1 % at IPO
and 6.3% at IPO+3, with higher equity ownership by founder-CEOs (Table
5, Panel A). 72 Table 3 provides an overview of factors associated with
founder voting power. We find that founder voting power is significantly
higher in firms that receive less pre-IPO financing, receive fewer rounds of
VC financing, go from initial VC financing to IPO more quickly, and are
dual-class.
We find only thirty-four dual-class IPOs among the 652 firms in the
IPO research sample, of which 41.2% have founder-CEO at IPO. Table 3
shows that founder voting power at IPO is significantly higher in dual-class
IPOs than in other IPOs (24.1% versus 10.4%), reflecting the effects of this
structure. But even among dual-class firms, founder-CEOs do not typically
have outright control (greater than 50% voting power). Google (which is in
our IPO research sample), Facebook, and Snap-three prominent dual-class
6' Kaplan et al., provides some information about founder equity ownership around IPO in
two samples of VC-backed firms (one of 106 firms, the other of thirty-two firms) but one
cannot determine founder-CEO voting power at IPO. See Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 96.
o In other words, we implicitly assume that all founders vote together to support the
founder-CEO. If not, our methodology overstates founder voting power and thus founder-CEO
voting power.
" There may well be stock-owning founders who are no longer officers or directors and
own less than 5% of the outstanding equity. For such firms (and for the IPO research sample
firms in aggregate), we understate average founder voting power. However, our main interest
is the frequency with which founders have large or controlling stakes, and our ability to esti-
mate this frequency is not impaired by our inability to identify founders owning stakes smaller
than 5%.
72 Our results are consistent with Kaplan et al. See Kaplan et al., supra note 5 (reporting
that in a sample of thirty-two VC-backed firms, average founder ownership at IPO is 9%, but
not distinguishing between firms with a founder-CEO and those without).
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firms in which the founders had voting control after the IPO-are outliers in
this respect.73
B. Founder-CEO/Blockholder atand after IPO
We now consider the frequency with which a founder is CEO at IPO
and (by herself or with other founders) has at least 30% voting power
("founder-CEO/blockholder"); we define this combination as "strong" con-
trol.74 Of the 652 firms in the IPO research sample, forty-six (7.1%) had a
founder with strong control upon completion of IPO (Table 5, Panel B).7 5
Figure 3 illustrates time trends in the percentage of IPOs with a founder-
CEO/blockholder. Panel A reports results over IPO vintage. It shows a gen-
eral decline in the likelihood of strong control for more recent IPOs despite
the increased use of dual-class structures in recent years.76 This decline may
be driven by the increased time to IPO over the past decade7 7 because, as
Table 3 shows, time to IPO negatively correlates with founder control. Con-
sistent with this explanation, Figure 3, Panel B shows little change in the rate
of founder-CEO/blockholders when sorted by financing vintage instead of
IPO vintage.
Again, we consider not only the extent of founder control after IPO, but
also whether this control is durable. We find that founder control declines in
the three years after IPO, as firms delist, founders quit or are removed from
the CEO position, or founder voting power is diluted by founder stock sales
or firm equity issuances. Table 5 reports the number and percentage of
founder-CEOs with 20% and 40% holdings, showing a similar pattern re-
gardless of the choice of blockholder threshold. The pattern of founders los-
ing strong control post-IPO is illustrated in Figure 3 by comparing the
likelihood of founder-CEO/blockholder at IPO (solid line) to IPO + 3 (dotted
" Interestingly, Google's founders controlled only about 38% of the votes at IPO. See
Google, Prospectus (Form 424(b)(4)) (Aug. 18, 2004). One year later, their voting control had
increased to 57%. See Google, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 20, 2006). We assume
that other holders of high-vote B shares sold stock, and these sales caused their B shares to
convert to low-vote A shares.
74 Generally, voting power of at least 40% is needed to make control non-contestable. We
chose a minimum of 30% voting power to be overinclusive. For completeness, however, we
also report frequencies for founder blocks with at least 20% and at least 40% voting power. Of
course, the degree of protection provided by a 20% or 30% block depends heavily on the
identities and sizes of other shareholders; the presence of activist shareholders and potential
hostile acquirers in the market; structural defenses in the corporation's charter (for example, a
staggered board); and the (often evolving) legal rules that would govern a control battle at a
particular firm at a particular point in time.
75 In another twenty firms, the founder group had at least 30% of the equity voting power
but a nonfounder served as CEO. Compare Table 5, Panel B, with Table 5, Panel C. In such
firms, a founder might have been able to remain CEO had he or she so chosen, and thus it
might be appropriate to include these firms as well. Table 5, Panel C thus reports results for
different amounts of founder voting power, without regard to whether a founder is the CEO.
76 See Field & Lowry, supra note 54, at 29, 43.
n See Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? The Hard
Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 83, 93 (2016).
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line). Indeed, of the forty-six founder-CEO/blockholders at IPO, only six-
teen remain at IPO+3 (Table 5). This decay is inconsistent with the "call
option on control" theory. It shows that many founder-CEO/blockholders
cannot, or do not wish to, maintain strong control. To the extent founders
anticipate not having durable control after IPO, they are likely to place less
value ex ante on any call option on control.
TABLE 5: FOUNDER VOTING POWER AT AND AFTER IPO
This table reports data on founder voting power (at IPO, IPO+1, and IPO+3) in 652 US-based
VC-backed IPO firms that received initial VC financing during 1990-2012. In Panel B we use
"F-CEO" to denote Founder-CEO.
Panel A
IPO IPO+1 IPO+3
Founder Voting Power % (unconditional) 11.1% 8.4% 6.3%
Founder Voting Power % (conditional)
-founder-CEO at IPO 17.3% 13.1% 10.0%
- nonfounder-CEO at IPO 6.6% 4.7% 2.9%
Panel B
IPO IPO+1 IPO+3
F-CEO + >20% Voting Power 80 45 25
- % of IPO Research Sample 12.3% 6.9% 3.8%
F-CEO + >30% Voting Power 46 25 16
- % of IPO Research Sample 7.1% 3.8% 2.5%
F-CEO + 40% Voting Power 28 10 5
- % of IPO Research Sample 4.3% 1.5% 0.8%
Panel C
IPO IPO+1 IPO+3
Founders with >20% Voting Power 133 78 47
- % of IPO Research Sample 20.4% 12.0% 7.2%
Founders with >30% Voting Power 66 38 20
- % of IPO Research Sample 10.1% 5.8% 3.1%
Founders with >40% Voting Power 42 24 10
- % of IPO Research Sample 6.4% 3.7% 1.5%
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FIGURE 3: Ex POST LIKELIHOOD OF FOUNDER-CEO/BLOCKHOLDER
AT AND AFTER IPO
Using data from a sample of 652 U.S.-based VC-backed IPO firms, the figures below plot
Lowess curves illustrating the likelihood that a sample firm has (at IPO, IPO+ 1, and IPO+3)
a founder with strong control: a founder is CEO and founders in aggregate hold at least 30% of
voting rights. Data are displayed separately based on IPO vintage (Panel A) and financing
vintage (Panel B).
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" Generally, the frequency of founder control at IPO+1 is higher than at IPO+3; the
apparently opposite relationship over some periods is an artifact of the Lowess curve's smooth-
ing function.
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V. Ex ANTE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTROL REACQUISITION VIA IPO
The "call option on control" theory assumes that the prospect of a con-
trol-returning IPO induces a control-valuing founder to cede control to VCs
in exchange for financing. To evaluate this assumption, we examine the ex
ante likelihood that a founder receiving an initial round of VC financing
later reacquires either weak or strong control via IPO.
As noted above, only about 10% of VC-backed firms in our VC-backed
population even make it to IPO. However, this figure reflects truncation
caused by the inclusion of firms from recent financing vintages. To minimize
truncation, we limit our ex ante analysis to pre-2003 financing vintages
(1990-2002). Such firms had at least ten years to reach IPO before data
collection. For these financing vintages, we find that 14.7% reached IPO
before 2013.79 They constitute 566 of the 652 firms in the full IPO research
sample.
A. Founder-CEO
In the pre-2003 financing vintages, we find-similar to the full IPO
research sample-that 42.2% of IPO firms had a founder-CEO (that is,
"weak" control) at completion of IPO. From an ex ante perspective, how-
" This result can be obtained from Table 1, Panel A by dividing the aggregate number of
IPOs of firms receiving initial VC financing during 1990-2002 (n= 1627) by the total number
of firms entering the VC-backed population during 1990-2002 (n= 11,104).
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ever, the founder must clear two hurdles: first, taking the firm public and,
second, remaining CEO at IPO. We find that only 6.2% of founders in the
VC-backed population are able to clear both hurdles and obtain at least weak
control at IPO (Table 6). The ex ante likelihood that a firm will conduct an
IPO and have durable weak control (that is, lasting through IPO+3) is about
half that (3.3%).
Within pre-2003 financing vintages, however, we find that the ex ante
probability of a founder reacquiring weak control declines over time. The
primary reason is the declining rate of IPOs since the late 1990s. For exam-
ple, Table 1 reports that 30%-40% of startups with early 1990s financing
vintages reached IPO. By contrast, only 4.5%-9.5% of firms in financing
vintages 1999-2002 reached IPO. So, even though the ex post likelihood
(that is, conditional on IPO) of founder-CEO at IPO remains relatively sta-
ble, we find a large decline in ex ante likelihood over time.
Figure 4 illustrates this trend. For each year, we take firms receiving
initial VC financing and from this annual cohort determine the number of
firms with a founder-CEO at IPO and IPO+3. After adjusting for sampling
rate, we estimate for each year the percentage of the VC-backed population
with both an IPO and a founder holding the CEO position (at IPO and at
IPO+3). Figure 4, Panel A shows a sharp decline over time in the ex ante
likelihood of founder-CEO. Indeed, for firms initially financed during
1999-2002, Figure 4 suggests a 2%-4% ex ante likelihood of founder-CEO
at IPO, with a lower likelihood at IPO+3.
TABLE 6: Ex ANTE LIKELIHOOD OF FOUNDER CONTROL
AT AND AFTER IPO
Using data from a sample of 11,104 U.S.-based VC-backed firms receiving initial VC financ-
ing during 1990-2002 (pre-2003 financing vintages of the VC-backed population), this table
reports the number and percentage of firms that ultimately had an IPO exit with a founder-
CEO (or with founder-CEO and various amounts of founder voting power), and the corre-
sponding number and percentages for IPO+ I and IPO+3.
IPO IPO+1 IPO+3
Founder-CEO (F-CEO) 239 194 126
- % of VC-backed population 6.2% 5.0% 3.3%
F-CEO + >20% voting power 71 41 21
- % of VC-backed population 1.8% 1.1% 0.5%
F-CEO + >30% voting power 39 21 14
- % of VC-backed population 1.0% 0.5% 0.4%
F-CEO + >40% voting power 23 9 4
- % of VC-backed population 0.6% 0.2% 0.1%
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FIGURE 4: Ex ANTE LIKELIHOOD OF FOUNDER CONTROL AT IIPO
Using data from a sample of 11,104 U.S.-based VC-backed firms receiving initial VC financ-
ing during 1990-2002 (pre-2003 financing vintages of the VC-backed population), the figures
below report the ex ante likelihood that these firms ultimately have founder-CEO at IPO and
IPO+3 (Panel A) and founder-CEO/blockholder on those two dates (Panel B).
Panel A: Ex Ante Likelihood of Founder-CEO (sorted by financing vintage)
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B. Founder-CEO/Blockholder
Figure 4, Panel B also reports the annual ex ante likelihood that a star-
tup will go public with a founder-CEO/blockholder. Over the entire sample
period, the ex ante likelihood of reacquiring strong control is less than 5%;
for post-1997 financing vintages, it is 1% or less. Table 6 shows that 1% of
VC-backed startups from 1990-2002 will go public and have a founder-
CEO/blockholder at IPO. This ex ante probability falls to 0.4% for durable
strong control. At the initial VC financing, the likelihood of a founder reac-
quiring durable, meaningful control has always been low, including when
Black & Gilson (1998)0 was published, casting doubt on the theory that the
possibility of an IPO gives founders a valuable call option on control at the
time of initial VC financing.
VI. VC RETURNS AND FOUNDER CONTROL IN TPO FiRMs
According to the "call option on control" theory, VCs implicitly prom-
ise to return control to those founders who are the most successful from
VCs' perspective-those who can achieve an IPO exit. Looking across all
VC-backed firms, one would expect a correlation between founders reac-
quiring control and VC returns upon exit. Indeed, IPO exits are on average
more lucrative than M&A exits, some of which are essentially a mere trans-
fer of intellectual property and human capital ("acqui-hires") rather than a
sale of a going concern," and founders sometimes retain control following
an IPO but never retain control in M&A exits.82
But the "call option on control" theory might also predict that, among
IPO firms, VC returns should correlate with founder control at IPO. If return
of control is a carrot dangled in front of founders to induce them to generate
returns for VCs, we would expect that carrot to be disproportionately given
to those founders of IPO firms that generate the highest returns for VCs. We
thus investigate whether founder control is correlated with VC profits across
IPO firms.
Table 7 provides a list of the largest IPOs in our IPO research sample
(the twenty-seven firms with market caps exceeding $1.5 billion at IPO).
Included are some familiar names, such as Google, Nextel, Groupon, and
Zynga. The frequency of founder-CEO at IPO is 52%, slightly higher than
the baseline rate (41%) in the full IPO research sample. Also higher are
average founder voting power at IPO (19% versus 11%) and dual-class fre-
quency (33% versus 5.2%). All of this suggests some correlation between
success and founder control. But even in these twenty-seven large IPOs,
almost 50% lack founder-CEO at IPO and the frequency of founder-CEO/
s0 See Black & Gilson (1998), supra note 3, at 5.
8 See Broughman & Fried (2010), supra note 6, at 386-87.
82 See supra Part I.
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blockholder at IPO is only 14.8% (versus 7.1% in the entire IPO research
sample).
To investigate the link between financial returns and founder control
across the entire research sample in more depth, we consider two alternative
(albeit crude) estimates for VC returns. The first is VC Net Payout. We start
by computing VCs' gross payout upon exit: VCs' estimated aggregate share
ownership at IPO multiplied by the IPO stock price.8 We then obtain VC
Net Payout by subtracting VCs' total investment from VCs' gross payout.
The second method is internal rate of return ("IRR"). Using data pro-
vided by the VX database on the timing and amount of each financing
round, and using the same assumptions about VCs' gross payouts that we use
to estimate VC Net Payout, we calculate the IRR on VC investments in each
firm ("VC IRR").15 The advantage of VC IRR over VC Net Payout is that it
adjusts (or discounts) for time value of money. The disadvantage is that VC
IRR can overstate the magnitude of VC profits when VC investment is close
in time to the iPO. Neither measure is ideal; we thus include both.
To reduce truncation bias, we use firms from pre-2003 financing vin-
tages that IPO before 2013. Figure 5 sorts these firms into deciles based on
VC Net Payout and VC IRR for each firm. We report the likelihood of
founder-CEO at IPO for each decile. The right side of each graph represents
the highest decile of VC Net Payout or VC IRR respectively, and the left
side represents the lowest. Figure 5 suggests there is no relationship between
founder-CEO at IPO and VC returns; the frequency of founder-CEO at IPO
is around 40% in each decile.
" We cannot directly observe the aggregate equity ownership of a firm's VC investors, as
this amount is not disclosed in the IPO prospectus and is not provided by VX. Instead, for each
firm, we assume that nonfounder employees hold approximately 15% of pre-IPO equity (VC-
backed firms generally reserve 10l%-15% of their cap table for employee equity). We then take
the total number of outstanding shares upon completion of IPO and we subtract (i) the number
of shares sold in the IPO; (ii) the number shares owned by the firm's founders; and (iii) the
number of shares assumed held by nonfounder employees. We assume the remaining shares
are held by VC investors. Admittedly, our estimate is rather crude, as nonfounder employees
may hold more or less than the assumed 15%. Nonetheless, for making a relative comparison
among firms, our assumption should provide a reasonable proxy.
' The actual timing of VC exit is generally delayed by lockups that prevent the VCs from
registering and selling their shares until (typically) 180 days after the IPO. Unfortunately, we
cannot observe the actual timing or price at which the VCs in each firm sell their shares.
Instead, we use the IPO offering price as a rough proxy for exit price.
5 We use the XIRR function in Excel to generate values for VC IRR.
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TABLE 7: FOUNDER CONTROL: LARGEST IPOs IN IPO RESEARCH SAMPLE
IPO Founder-
Company Year CEO
Google, Inc. 2004 No
Groupon Inc 2008 Yes
360networks, Inc. 2000 No
Zynga, Inc. 2011 Yes
Nextel Partners Inc 2000 Yes
Global Telesystems Inc 1998 No
Workday, Inc. 2012 Yes
LinkedIn Corp 2003 No
Zayo Group LLC 2007 Yes
NorthPoint Communications, Inc. 1999 Yes
Vonage Holdings Corporation 2006 No
Handspring, Inc. 2000 Yes
Akamai Technologies, Inc. 1999 No
Tritel, Inc. 1999 No
Priceline.com, Inc. 1999 No
FireEye Inc 2006 No
CenturyLink Technology Solution 2000 No
Nutanix Inc 2011 Yes
Cinemark Holdings, Inc. 2007 No
eToys, Inc. 1999 Yes
Onvia, Inc. 2000 Yes
VeraSun Energy Corporation 2006 No
Utstarcom Inc 2000 Yes
FreeMarkets, Inc. 1999 Yes
Next Level Communications Inc 1999 Yes
Rhythms Netconnections Inc 1999 No
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FIGURE 5: NON-CORRELATION BETWEEN VC RETURNS AND
FOUNDER-CEO AT IPO
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To investigate the connection between VC profits and founder control
at I1PO in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following equation:
2020] Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That Go Public?
Founder Control = a + f;1*VC Profits + P*X + E
where £ is the error term and X is a vector of included control variables.
Founder Control represents two different dependent variables used in the
analysis below:
(i) Founder-CEO equals 1 if founder-CEO at IPO, and 0 otherwise;
(ii) Founder-CEO/Blockholder equals 1 if founder-CEO at IPO and
founders (in aggregate) have voting power of least 30% at close of
IPO, and 0 otherwise.
VC Profits represents the two explanatory variables-VC Net Payout and
VC IRR-which we use as proxies for VC returns at each firm. In the re-
gression context, VC IRR is winsorized at the 90% level to reduce the im-
pact of extreme IRR values. All variables are observed at close of IPO.
We control for several explanatory variables that may impact founder
control, including years from initial VC financing to IPO; amount of pre-
IPO VC financing; number of VC rounds; number of VC firms; and pres-
ence of an elite VC firm. We also control for dual-class voting structure (use
of which suggests an intent to preserve founder control), Delaware domicile,
and California headquarters. Each model also includes dummies for business
sector, headquarters location, and financing vintage year.
Results are reported in Table 8. In each model, our proxies for VC re-
turns have an insignificant (or negative) impact on the likelihood of founder-
control reacquisition in the event of IPO. For example, in Model 1 we find
an insignificant correlation between VC Net Payout and Founder-CEO, and
in Model 2 we find a negative correlation (significant at the 10% level) be-
tween VC IRR and Founder-CEO. Similarly, we find a negative correlation
between VC returns and both the likelihood of founder-CEO/blockholder at
IPO (Models 3, 4) and the likelihood of founder equity of at least 30% at
IPO (Models 5, 6). If anything, the results in Table 8 suggest-contrary to
the control-reacquisition theory-that founders of IPO firms that generate
the most profits for VCs are less likely to reacquire control at IPO.
86
86 This finding is consistent with evidence that VCs' replacement of founders as CEO can
improve startup performance. See Ewens & Marx, supra note 7, at 29.
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TABLE 8: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF FOUNDER CONTROL AT IPO
Using data from 562 U.S.-based VC-backed firms that received initial financing during
1990-2002 and completed an IPO prior to 2013, this table reports marginal effects based on
logit estimates evaluated at the mean of each variable. Depending on the model, the dependent
variable is Founder-CEO (Models 1, 2), Founder-CEO & Equity 30% (Models 3, 4), or
Founder Equity 30% (Models 5, 6). All variables are defined as of the completion of IPO.
Standard errors are reported below each coefficient estimate. We use a two-sided test for statis-
tical significance (* = 10%; ** 5%; *** = 1% significance).
--- Logit Marginal Effects ---
Founder-CEO Founder-CEO & Founder
Equity 30% Equity > 30%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variable
VCNet Payout -.0001 -.0000* -.0000
(.000) (.000) (.000)
VCIRR -.031* -.002 -.010**
(.018) (.002) (.004)
Years from VCfinancing to IPO -.022** -.027** -.002* -.004* -.009** .013*
(.010) (.012) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.004)
Amount of pre-IPO financing -.0003 .0005* .0019 .0001 .012 .005
(.000) (.000) (.002) (.004) (.015) (.015)
Number of VC rounds .005 .002 .000 .001 .001 .000
(.011) (.011) (.000) (.001) (.003) (.003)
Number of VC investors -.008 -.006 -.002* -.003** -.009*** -.008***
(.006) (.006) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002)
Financed by elite VC -.046 -.053 .005 .004 .015 .016
(.056) (.056) (.003) (.005) (.017) (.016)
Dual-class IPO .061 .028 .009* .012 .062** .057**
(.121) (.116) (.006) (.008) (.026) (.023)
Delaware incorporation -.027 -.013 -.001 -.004 -.011 -.011
(.058) (.059) (.002) (.005) (.015) (.014)
California headquarters -.120** -.124** -.002 -.003 -.018 -.016
(.051) (.052) (.002) (.004) (.014) (.013)
State Headquarters Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of first VC financing Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 558 540 558 540 558 540
Pseudo R-squared .074 .074 .456 .388 .258 .271
VII. WHAT CAN THE DATA TELL Us?
As discussed in Part V, the ex ante likelihood that a founder receiving
first-round VC financing will reacquire control at IPO is extremely low,
whether weak (founder-CEO) or strong (founder-CEO/blockholder). The ex
ante likelihood that control will be durable is even lower; about 50% of
founders lose by IPO+3 whatever type of control they reacquire at IIPO, as
many IPO firms delist shortly after IIPO, and many founders leave the CEO
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position even when the firm remains public. It seems unlikely that most
founders, in deciding whether to accept funding from VCs, would weigh
such low-probability outcomes heavily.
Despite the low ex ante probability of reacquiring control via IPO, we
cannot rule out the possibility that this prospect sways some founders to give
up control to VCs, and these founders' willingness to accept VC financing
drives the venture ecosystem. There could be many founders who either be-
lieve they are "above average" and thus likely to reacquire durable control
via IIPO, and would turn down VC funding if such control reacquisition were
not possible, or accept VC financing only because they receive a call option
on control, but then later choose not to exercise the option. And perhaps
there are enough such founders to generate a large fraction of VC returns
and underwrite the ecosystem's vitality. Thus, our findings cannot disprove
the "call option on control" theory linking VC and stock markets. All they
can do is shed light on its plausibility.
However, current trends in VC investing and exits, taken as a whole,
provide additional reason to be skeptical that the VC ecosystem is driven by
VCs' ability to give founders a call option on control. As noted earlier, IPO
frequency has declined dramatically over the last fifteen years. Thus, the ex
ante likelihood of control reacquisition is likely to be far lower now than in
the past. After 2000, the IPO market essentially dried up"7 and returned to
low, pre-1990 levels, in both dollar volume and number of exits. M&A exits,
which at best make founders hired managers of the acquirer, appear to have
become more frequent and larger."' In theory, the decrease in IPOs could
have been more than offset by an increase in the ex post frequency of
founder control (that is, conditional on IPO). But our data show that this ex
post likelihood has been flat or declining over time.
If VCs' ability to give founders a valuable call option on control stimu-
lates venture activity, we would expect VC activity to have declined in re-
cent years as it became apparent to founders that the ex ante likelihood of
IPO (as of initial VC financing) was starting to approach zero. However, VC
investment, which hovered in the range of $25-$40 billion annually during
8 See Robert P. Bartlett et al., supra note 50; Rose & Solomon, supra note 77, at 102-03.
8 One of the largest M&A exits to date was Facebook's acquisition of WhatsApp for $19
billion in 2014. See Parmy Olson, Facebook Closes $19 Billion WhatsApp Deal, FoRBEs (Oct.
6, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/10/06/facebook-closes-19-billion-
whatsapp-deal/#6f9446325c66. In 2016, there appears to have been at least one M&A exit
over $10 billion (Stemcentrx, $10.2 billion), and at least five M&A exits between $1 and $10
billion (Acerta Pharma, $4 billion; Jet, $3.3 billion; Jasper, $1.4 billion; Afferent Pharmaceuti-
cals, $1.25 billion; Cruise Automation, $1 billion). See 2016 Year Review: Top 5 VC deals,
exits & funds, PrfCHBOOK (Dec. 23, 2016), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/2016-year-in-
review-top-5-vc-deals-exits-funds; Cromwell Schubarth, $10.2 Stemcentrx sale is one of the
biggest in venture capital history, BIZJOURNALS.COM (Apr. 28 2016), https://www.bizjournals
.com/sanjose/blog/techflash/2016/04/10-2b-stemcentrx-sale-is-one-of-the-biggest-in.html;
Riley McDermid, Autonomous car startup bought by GM plans to add 1,100 jobs in S.F.,
BlZIOURNALS.COM (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.bizjoumals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2017/04/
05/gm-autonomous-car-startup-jobs.html.
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2001-2013, jumped to over $60 billion annually during 2014-2016, ap-
proaching late-1990s levels.9 To be sure, if there were more IPOs and a
greater likelihood of founder-control reacquisition, VC investment might
have been even higher. But the point is this: there can be robust venture
activity in the United States-indeed, more VC investment than the rest of
the world combined-even if the ex ante likelihood of IPO exit has become
extremely remote.
CONCLUSION
We have investigated the likelihood that founders of U.S.-based VC-
backed startups reacquire control at IPO, in part to shed light on the plausi-
bility of the claim that VCs' ability to use the prospect of an IPO exit as a
means to give founders a call option on control can explain why a deep and
liquid stock market is required to sustain a robust VC ecosystem.
Examining more than 18,000 U.S. startups that received initial VC fi-
nancing between 1990 and 2012, we find that it is highly unlikely that any
given founder will reacquire via IPO any form of control that is durable
(lasts at least three years after iPO). The ex ante likelihood that a founder
will reacquire durable weak control (founder is CEO, but controls less than
30% of equity voting power) is approximately 3%. The ex ante likelihood of
reacquiring durable strong control (founder is CEO and the founder group
controls at least 30% of equity voting power) is much lower: about 0.4%.
Our results suggest that founders, who must decide years before a po-
tential IPO whether to accept initial VC funding, are unlikely to put much
weight on the possibility of reacquiring control in an IPO. Our findings,
along with the fact that the IPO market has been moribund for the last fifteen
years even as VC financing in the United States is nearing peak levels, cast
some doubt on the validity of the "call option on control" theory linking
IPOs and venture investment, and thus call into question the more general
proposition that deep and liquid stock markets are necessary for a robust VC
ecosystem.
89 See PwC, Value of Venture Capital Investment in the United States from 1995 to 2018
(in Billion U.S. Dollars), STArISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/277501/venture-capital-
amount-invested-in-the-united-states-since-1995/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
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